We consider a problem of assigning slots to a group of agents. Each slot can serve only one agent at a time and it is located along a line. Each agent has a most preferred slot and incurs disutility when she is assigned away from the most preferred slot. Furthermore, we assume that each agent's utility is equal to the amount of monetary transfer minus the distance from the peak to her assigned slot. In this paper, we investigate how to assign slots to agents in an efficient and fair way. First, by using a bipartite graph of the slot allocation problem, we present a simple way of identifying all efficient assignments. Next, we introduce two allocation rules for the problem, the leximin and the leximax rules, and discuss their properties. this paper, we restrict the preference domain by assuming an additional structure on slots.
Introduction
We consider the following class of slot allocation problems. There is a group of agents who must be served in a slot. Each slot can handle only one agent at a time and it is located along a line. 1 Each agent's utility is equal to the amount of monetary transfer minus the distance from the peak to her assigned slot. We assume that agents differ in their most preferred slots. We are interested in deciding an efficient and fair way of assigning slots to agents and the monetary compensations they receive. 2 This slot allocation problem is motivated by practical concerns arising in the real life. For example, the problem arises when golfers want to make a reservation to play a golf on a nice weekend. Each golfer has a most preferred starting time which can be different across golfers.
What will be an efficient and fair way of assigning time slots to golfers? Also, the problem arises when students are supposed to be interviewed by their professor for scholarship. Each student has a most preferred time slot which is different across students. What will be an efficient and fair way of assigning time slots to students? An ordinal version of this model, which assumes that agents have ordinal preferences over the slots, has been studied by Hougaard et al. (2014) . Also, related problems of assigning landing slots to airlines have been studied recently by Schummer and Vohra (2013) and Schummer and Abizada (2013) . 3 In this paper, we also assume that each agent has quasi-linear preferences over the slot and the money. An assignment is a vector of assigned slots to agents and it is feasible if no two agents have the same slot and all slots are assigned to agents. A feasible assignment is efficient if it minimizes the disutilities of agents among all feasible assignments. An allocation consists of an assignment and monetary transfers to agents. An allocation is feasible it an assignment is feasible and the sum of monetary transfers is not positive. An allocation rule assigns to each problem a nonempty subset of feasible allocations.
First, we characterize all efficient assignments of a problem by using a bipartite graph. We identify slots depending on their demands and make a proposal on how to form the links. We show that the resulting edge set coincides with the union of edges of all efficient assignments.
We also show that choosing an efficient assignment is equivalent to selecting a feasible subgraph from the edge set. By assuming a simple preference, we can easily characterize all efficient assignments by checking the bipartite graph.
We next introduce two allocation rules for the problem, the leximin rule and the leximax rule, and investigate their properties. For the leximin rule, first, we select an efficient assignment with a zero monetary transfer in which the maximal dissatisfaction of agents is lexicographically minimized. The utility of each agent is the average of her utilities at all such assignments.
For the leximax rule, we select an efficient assignment with a zero monetary transfer in which the number of agents with the smallest distance between her peak and her assigned slot is lexicographically maximized. Once again, each agent receives her average utility of all such assignments.
Golf is very popular in Korea, but it is very difficult to reserve a slot in the weekend. A private membership which allows a member to book once a month costs around $100,000. If a member can book all weekends, then its membership will cost around $1,000,000. Therefore, it is common for each golf club to ask its members when to play. Moreover, to minimize the complaint from the members, it is a common practice to use the leximin rule. On the other hand, for some clubs owned by the private companies, the booking is hierarchically confirmed from top to bottom which results in an assignment similar to the leximax assignment.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 contains some preliminaries including graph theoretic definitions. Section 3 characterizes all efficient assignments by using a bipartite graph.
Section 4 introduces two allocation rules for the problem and discusses their properties.
Preliminaries

The problem
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents and S = {1, . . . , s} be the set of slots. Each agent wants to have a slot to get a service and each slot can accommodate only one agent. Moreover, we assume that the slots are located along a line and each agent i ∈ N has a single-peaked preference R i defined over S, which means that there is a peak p(R i ) ∈ S such that for all j,
Furthermore, we assume that the utility decreases by a constant as she moves away from the peak. If agent i's slot position is σ i , then she incurs a decrease in her utility by the amount of |σ i − p(R i )|. Since each agent's preference can completely be determined by her peak, for simplicity of notation, we denote agent i's preference by her peak p i ≡ p(R i ) ∈ S and the profile of agents' preferences by p = (p i ) i∈N .
A slot allocation problem (or simply a problem) is defined as a tuple (S, p), where S is the set of slots and p is the vector of peaks. Let S N be the class of all problems with the set of agents N . Throughout this paper, we assume that N = S = {1, 2, . . . , n} if there is no explicit mention.
An assignment for (S, p) ∈ S N is a vector σ = (σ i ) i∈N , where for each i ∈ N, σ i denotes agent i's slot. An assignment σ is feasible if no two agents are assigned the same slot, that is, for all i, i ′ ∈ N, i = i ′ implies σ i = σ i ′ . Let Σ(S, p) be the set of all feasible assignments for (S, p). For all (S, p) ∈ S N , all i ∈ N, and all σ ∈ Σ(S, p), let |σ i − p i | be the dissatisfaction of agent i in σ, which is the disutility of agent i from the assignment of slot σ i while having her peak p i . Given (S, p) ∈ S N , let T D(σ) = i∈N |σ i − p i | be the total dissatisfaction of σ, which is the sum of the dissatisfactions of all agents. An assignment σ ∈ Σ(S, p) is efficient if it minimizes the total dissatisfaction, that is,
be the set of all efficient assignments for (S, p). An assignment σ is order-preserving if for any An allocation for (S, p) ∈ S N is a pair (σ, t), where for each i ∈ N, σ i denotes agent i's slot and t i the monetary transfer to her. An allocation (σ, t) is feasible if σ is feasible and the sum of monetary transfers is not positive. Thus, the set of all feasible allocations Z(S, p) consists of all pairs (σ, t) such that σ ∈ Σ(S, p) and i∈N t i ≤ 0. We assume that preferences are quasi-linear, that is, for all i ∈ N and all (σ, t) ∈ Z(S, p),
An allocation rule, or a rule, is a mapping ϕ which associates to each (S, p) ∈ S N , a nonempty subset of feasible allocations. The pair (σ i , t i ) ∈ ϕ i (S, p) represents agent i's slot and her transfer in (S, p). From now on, we denote the agents by i, i ′ , and the slots by j, j ′ .
A component
For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all j ∈ S, let L j (S, p) = {i ∈ N | p i ≤ j} be the set of agents whose peaks are less than or equal to j. If there is no danger of confusion, we denote L j (S, p) by L j .
Also, for each j ∈ S,
From the above definition, it is clear that slot j is COD if and only if slot j is OD and slot j − 1 is not OD.
Let j 1 , j 2 , . . . , j k be the slots such that j 1 < j 2 < · · · < j k and |L ja | = j a . Since |L n | = n, j k = n. Let j 0 = 0. For each a ∈ {1, 2, . . . , k}, the set of slots {j a−1 + 1, j a−1 + 2, . . . , j a } is a component of S. In each component, the number of slots is equal to the number of agents.
Note that for each a ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, slots j a and j a + 1 belong to two different components.
Therefore, for each j ∈ S,
For two slots j, j ′ ∈ S, if they belong to the same component, we denote by j ∼ C j ′ .
Example 1: Let (S, p) ∈ S N be such that S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8} and p = (3, 3, 3, 3, 4, 5, 7, 7).
Then L 3 = {1, 2, 3, 4} and L 6 = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6}, etc. The following table counts the elements of L j . Slot j 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 |L j | 0 0 4 5 6 6 8 8 .
Therefore, slots 6 and 8 are component divisors, and so {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and {7, 8} are components.
Slots 1 and 2 are UD, and the others are OD. Note that slots 3 and 7 are COD.
5 For slot 1, it is COD if |L1| > 1. 6 Since slot j + 1 is also on the boundary of two components, j + 1 might be chosen as a component divisor. In this paper, we choose j to include n as a component divisor.
A bipartite graph
A bipartite graph associated with a problem can be used to characterize all efficient assignments.
To define such a bipartite graph, we first introduce basic notation and terminology of graph theory. A graph is an ordered pair (V, E) of a nonempty finite set V and a family E of 2-subsets of V . An element of V is called a vertex and an element of E an edge. Also, the set V is the vertex set and E the edge set. For a graph G, V (G) and E(G) denote the vertex set and the
and there is no edge joining two vertices in the same partite set. We denote by (X, Y ) the bipartition of a bipartite graph G, and by (x, y) an edge of a bipartite graph
For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all j ∈ S, we define a set S j ⊆ S by 7
Let P be the set of all possible peaks, which is equal to the set of slots S. Let B(S, p) be the bipartite graph with bipartition (P, S) defined as follows:
As shown in Figure 1 , an edge of B(S, p) connects a peak p i ∈ P of agent i ∈ N with each
For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all σ ∈ Σ(S, p), as shown in Figure 2 , a bipartite graph B(σ) with bipartition (P, S) is defined as follows:
A bipartite graph g with bipartition (P, S) is feasible in (S, p) if there is a feasible assignment σ ∈ Σ(S, p) such that g = B(σ). Note that for a feasible bipartite graph g in (S, p), the degree of p i ∈ P in g is equal to the number of agents whose peaks are p i , and the degree of j ∈ S is exactly equal to one. 7 In the following, Sj is considered when there is an agent i ∈ N such that pi = j. are crossing if and only if
We establish the equivalence between the efficiency of an assignment and the condition of no crossing edges for B(σ), whose proof is given in Appendix I. 8
Theorem 1. For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all σ ∈ Σ(S, p), σ is efficient if and only if B(σ) has no crossing edges.
It is easy to see that for any two order-preserving assignments σ, σ ′ ∈ Σ(S, p), B(σ) = B(σ ′ ).
Useful observations
We present several observations.
Lemma 2. For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all j ∈ S, 
Now suppose that there exist two COD slots j, j ′ ∈ S which belong to the same component.
We assume without loss of generality that j < j ′ . Note that j and j ′ are OD. Since j ≤ j ′ − 1 and j and j ′ belong to the same component, j ′ − 1 is not a component divisor, which implies by (i) that j ′ − 1 is OD. On the other hand, since j ′ is COD, by the definition of COD, j ′ − 1 is not OD, a contradiction. In addition, if a component does not have a COD slot, then it is obvious from (i) that the component does not have any OD slot. Therefore, (iii) holds.
Lemma 3. For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all i ∈ N , there is σ ∈ Σ Eff (S, p) such that σ i = p i .
Proof. Let σ ∈ Σ Eff (S, p) and i ∈ N be given. If σ i = p i , then we are done. Now suppose that
be the assignment obtained by switching two slots assigned to agents i and i ′ . Then,
assignment from the bipartite graph. In fact, this argument becomes possible since we assume that each agent's disutility changes by the same amount as moving away from the peak.
where the inequality comes from the triangle inequality. Since T D(σ) is the minimum total dissatisfaction of agents, σ * is also efficient.
Lemma 4. For all (S, p) ∈ S N , all σ ∈ Σ Eff (S, p), and all j ∈ S,
Proof. (i) Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a slot j ∈ S such that |L j | ≥ j and
. . , j}. We will show that (p i , σ i ) and (p i ′ , σ i ′ ) satisfy four conditions (1) -(4) in the definition of crossing edges.
Since (3) follows. In addition, from two inequalities that
(1) and (2) hold. Therefore, (p i , σ i ) and (p i ′ , σ i ′ ) are crossing edges, which by Theorem 1, contradicts to the efficiency of σ.
(ii) Suppose by way of contradiction that there exists a slot j ∈ S such that |L j | ≤ j and σ(L j ) ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , j}. Then there is i ′ ∈ N such that i ′ ∈ L j and σ i ′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , j}. Since |{1, 2, . . . , j}| = j ≥ |L j |, there exists i ∈ N such that σ i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , j} and i ∈ L j . Since i ∈ L j and i ′ ∈ L j , it follows that σ i ≤ j < p i and p i ′ ≤ j < σ i ′ . Therefore, (1) -(4) hold for agents i and i ′ , which implies that (p i , σ i ) and (p i ′ , σ i ′ ) are crossing edges. By Theorem 1, we have a contradiction.
From Lemma 4, at any efficient assignment σ, if |L j | = j, then σ(L j ) = {1, 2, . . . , j}, which implies that a slot assigned to an agent must be a slot in the same component.
Corollary 5. For all (S, p) ∈ S N , all σ ∈ Σ Eff (S, p), and all components S C of S, the set of agent having an assigned slot in S C by σ is equal to the set of agents having a peak in S C , that is,
A characterization of efficient assignments
In this section, we characterize all efficient assignments of a problem by using a bipartite graph Proof. From the definition of S j and Corollary 5, we may assume that (S, p) has only one component. Then, n is the only component divisor.
Recall that E(B(S, p) 
Take any (p i , j) ∈ i∈N {(p i , j) | j ∈ S p i } for some i ∈ N and j ∈ S p i . If p i = j, then by Lemma 3, (p i , j) is an edge of B(σ) for some efficient assignment σ and so (5) holds.
Now we consider the case when p i = j. Since a similar argument can be developed for the case when p i > j by introducing
If p i is UD, by the definition of S p i , j ≤ p i , which implies that p i is either OD or a component divisor. Since n is the only component divisor and p i < j ≤ n, it follows that p i is OD.
Let σ be an order-preserving assignment. If p i is not COD, then from the order-preserveness of σ, p i < σ i . If p i is COD, then there is i ′′ ∈ N such that p i ′′ = p i and σ i ′′ > p i . In addition,
Replacing i by i ′′ gives p i < σ i . Altogether, from now on, we assume that
Let i ′ ∈ N be such that
, the desired conclusion. Now we consider the case that
Since σ is order-preserving, p i ≥ p i ′ . Let σ * be the assignment obtained from σ by switching assigned slots of i and i ′ . Then,
By (6) and assumptions,
It follows that
Therefore, T D(σ * ) = T D(σ), which implies by Lemma 1 that σ * is an efficient assignment.
) from the definition of E(B(σ * )), (5) holds.
Since σ is order-preserving, p i ≤ p i ′ . Let N A ⊆ N be the set of agents whose assigned slots in σ are between σ i and σ i ′ , that is,
Since σ is order-preserving, for all i ′′ ∈ N A , p i ≤ p i ′′ ≤ p i ′ . In addition, we may assume without loss of generality that N A = {i 1 , i 2 , . . . , i ℓ } satisfies:
• p i a−1 ≤ p ia for all a ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ},
• σ ia = σ i a−1 + 1 for all a ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}.
Take any a ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ}.
which implies that p ia is not COD. Since σ is order-preserving, p ia < σ ia . On the other hand, if p ia = p i for some 2 ≤ a ≤ ℓ, then together with (7), p ia = p i < σ i ≤ σ ia . Therefore, for all a ∈ {2, . . . , ℓ},
Let σ * be the assignment obtained from σ by assigning slot σ i ′ to agent i and moving the assigned slot of agents in N A \ {i} one slot to the left, that is,
Together with (8),
Therefore, T D(σ * ) = T D(σ). As shown in Hougaard et al. (2014, Lemma 1) , an orderpreserving assignment is efficient, and therefore σ * is efficient. Since (p i , j) = (p i , σ i ′ ) = (p i , σ * i ) ∈ E(B(σ * )), from the definition of E(B(σ * )), (5) holds.
To show the other direction that
take any edge (p i , σ i ) of B(σ) of an efficient assignment σ for some i ∈ N . It is sufficient to show that σ i ∈ S p i .
As we assume that (S, p) has only one component, it is obvious that p i ∼ C σ i . Note that if
Now we consider the case when p i = σ i , and p i is either UD or OD (but not COD). First,
Next, suppose that p i > σ i . If p i is OD (but not COD), then p i − 1 is also OD and |L p i −1 | ≥
which implies that σ i ∈ σ(L p i −1 ) and i ∈ L p i −1 . Then, p i ≤ p i − 1, which is a contradiction.
Therefore, p i is UD. Since p i > σ i , by the definition of S p i , σ i ∈ S p i . Suppose by way of contradiction that B(σ) has crossing edges (p i , σ i ) and (p i ′ , σ i ′ ) such that 
Therefore, p i ′ is OD.
Since p i ′ < p i , by (i) of Lemma 2, p i is also OD. By Lemma 2 again, p i is not COD. From the definition of B(S, p) and S p i , for any edge (p i , j) of B(S, p), j ≥ p i . Since (p i , σ i ) is an edge of B(S, p), σ i ≥ p i , a contradiction. Altogether, we conclude that B(σ) does not have crossing edges.
Two rules for the problem
In this section, we introduce two rules for the problem and discuss their properties. The leximin rule maximizes lexicographically the utility of the worst-off agent. On the other hand, the leximax rule maximizes lexicographically the utility of the best-off agent.
The leximin rule
For all (S, p) ∈ S N , all (σ, t) ∈ Z(S, p), and all i ∈ N , the utility of agent i at (σ, t) is defined
If there is no transfer between agents, then t = 0 and 
Note that at any leximin allocation, the leximin rule assigns the same utility to each agent, that is, for all (σ min , t min ) ∈ ϕ min (S, p) and all i ∈ N, u i (σ min i , t min i ; p i ) = u min i (S, p). This rule maximizes lexicographically the utility of the worst-off agent. Equivalently, this rule can be obtained by lexicographically minimizing the maximum dissatisfaction of agents.
Next, we show that a leximin assignment is order-preserving. For all i, i ′ ∈ N, two edges
It is obvious that if B(σ) has weakly crossing edges, then σ is not an order-preserving assignment. Conversely, if σ is not an order-preserving assignment, then there are two agents i and i ′ such that p i ′ < p i and σ i < σ i ′ , which implies that B(σ) has weakly crossing edges. Altogether, we have the following lemma. has no weakly crossing edges.
Next lemma shows that for a leximin assignment σ, B(σ) has no weakly crossing edges.
Lemma 9. For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all σ ∈ Σ(S, p), if σ is a leximin assignment, then B(σ) has no weakly crossing edges.
Proof. Let σ ∈ Σ(S, p) be a leximin assignment. Suppose by way of contradiction that B(σ) has weakly crossing edges. Then there are two agents i and i ′ ∈ N such that p i ′ < p i and σ i < σ i ′ .
Let σ * be a feasible assignment such that
Then for all i ′′ ∈ N \ {i, i ′ }, the dissatisfactions of the agent i ′′ in σ and σ * are the same, that
Case 1: σ i ≥ p i .
Therefore, u(σ * ) ≻ lex u(σ), which contradicts to the assumption that σ is a leximin assignment.
Case 3: σ i < p i and σ i ′ > p i ′ .
Case 3-2: σ i ′ < p i and σ i ≥ p i ′ .
Since
, which contradicts to the assumption that σ is a leximin assignment.
Case 3-3: σ i ′ ≥ p i and σ i ≥ p i ′ .
Case 3-4: σ i ′ < p i and σ i < p i ′ .
, which contradicts to the assumption that σ is a leximin assignment. Now we show that the set of all leximin assignments is equal to the set of all order-preserving assignments.
Theorem 10. For all (S, p) ∈ S N and all σ ∈ Σ(S, p), σ is an order-preserving assignment if and only if σ is a leximin assignment.
Proof. If σ is a leximin assignment, by Lemmas 8 and 9, σ is order-preserving. Conversely, let σ be an order-preserving assignment. Let σ ′ be a leximin assignment among all assignments in Σ(S, p). Then, by the 'if' part, σ ′ is order-preserving. Since both σ and σ ′ are order-preserving,
. Therefore, σ is also a leximin assignment.
The leximax rule
In this subsection, we introduce the leximax rule which lexicographically maximizes the utility of the best-off agent. Given (S, p) ∈ S N , let σ max ∈ Σ(S, p) be an assignment such that for 
Once again, note that at any leximax allocation, the leximax rule assigns the same utility to each agent, that is, for all (σ max , t max ) ∈ ϕ max (S, p) and all i ∈ N, u i (σ max
This rule maximizes lexicographically the utility of best-off agents. Equivalently, this rule can be obtained by lexicographically maximizing the minimum dissatisfaction of agents.
Example 2: Let S = {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6} and p = (2, 3, 3, 5, 6, 6). The bipartite graph B(S, p) be illustrated in Figure 3 . Let σ be a leximax assignment. Since there are four slots which are to maximize the number of agents receiving the highest available utility among all unassigned agents, then it will be an efficient leximax assignment. For example, at the first step, maximize the number of agents with the utility of 0, at the second step, maximize the number of agents with the utility of -1, and so on. Let g be the output of this algorithm. Then, g = B(σ) for some feasible assignment σ. Since g is a subgraph of B(S, p), by Theorem 7, σ is efficient. Therefore, it is obvious that σ is an efficient leximax assignment. In Appendix II, we describe an algorithm to find a leximax assignment. Note that for some distinct slots j, j ′ , j ′′ such that j ′ < j < j ′′ , it is impossible to have (j ′ , j) and (j ′′ , j) as two edges of B(S, p). Therefore, for two efficient leximax assignments σ and σ ′ , B(σ) = B(σ ′ ), which implies that the leximax assignment is unique except for the agents with the same peak. Appendix I: Proof of Theorem 1
Suppose that B(σ) has crossing edges (p i , σ i ) and (p i ′ , σ i ′ ). Let σ * be a feasible assignment obtained by switching the assigned slots of agents i and i ′ . That is,
Then,
Suppose that two agents i and i ′ in N satisfy (1) -(4). By (3) and (4),
and α = −σ i + p i + σ i ′ − p i ′ − |σ i ′ − p i | − |σ i − p i ′ |. Four cases are possible:
(i) If σ i ′ < p i and σ i < p i ′ , then
where the last inequality comes from (3).
(ii) If σ i ′ < p i and σ i ≥ p i ′ , then
where the last inequality comes from (2).
(iii) If σ i ′ ≥ p i and σ i < p i ′ , then
where the last inequality comes from (1).
(iv) If σ i ′ ≥ p i and σ i ≥ p i ′ , then
where the last inequality comes from (4).
Therefore, α > 0 and T D(σ * ) < T D(σ), which implies that switching the assigned slots of agents i and i ′ reduces the total dissatisfaction. Therefore, σ is not efficient.
To show the converse statement, suppose that B(σ) has no crossing edges. If σ is orderpreserving, then by Hougaard et al. (2014, Lemma 1) , it is efficient. Now suppose that σ is not order-preserving. It is sufficient to show that the total cost of σ is equal to the total cost of some order-preserving assignment. Since σ is not order-preserving, there are two agents i and i ′ ∈ N , such that p i ′ < p i and σ i < σ i ′ . Since B(σ) has no crossing edges and (p i , σ i ) and (p i ′ , σ i ′ ) are its edges, either p i ′ ≥ σ i ′ or σ i ≥ p i . Let σ * be the assignment obtained by switching the assigned slots of agents i and i ′ . Then,
Therefore, T D(σ) = T D(σ * ). If σ * is order-preserving, then we are done. If not, we repeat the process above again until we obtain an order-preserving assignment. At the end, we can conclude that T D(σ) = T D(σ ′ ) for some order-preserving assignment σ ′ and obtain the desired conclusion.
Appendix II: Algorithm for an efficient leximax assignment
We present an algorithm to find an efficient leximax assignment as discussed in subsection 4.2.
Algorithm A Input: A problem (S, p) ∈ S N Output: A feasible bipartite graph g of B(S, p)
Initialization: Let a = 0, j = 0, and Q = ∅, R = ∅
Step 1. Select all edges (j, j ′ ) of B(S, p) such that j = j ′ (if such edge exists), and let Q be the set of those edges, and R be the vertices in S not joined by an edge in Q, that is, Q = {(j, j ′ ) ∈ E(B(S, p)) | j = j ′ } R = {j ′ ∈ S | (j, j ′ ) ∈ Q for all j ∈ P }.
